The prior can generally only be understood in the context of the
  likelihood by Gelman, Andrew et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
07
48
7v
2 
 [s
tat
.M
E]
  3
1 A
ug
 20
17
The prior can generally only be understood in the context of the likelihood∗
Andrew Gelman† Daniel Simpson‡ Michael Betancourt§
28 Aug 2017
Abstract
A key sticking point of Bayesian analysis is the choice of prior distribution, and there is
a vast literature on potential defaults including uniform priors, Jeffreys’ priors, reference pri-
ors, maximum entropy priors, and weakly informative priors. These methods, however, often
manifest a key conceptual tension in prior modeling: a model encoding true prior information
should be chosen without reference to the model of the measurement process, but almost all
common prior modeling techniques are implicitly motivated by a reference likelihood. In this
paper we resolve this apparent paradox by placing the choice of prior into the context of the
entire Bayesian analysis, from inference to prediction to model evaluation.
1. The role of the prior distribution in a Bayesian analysis
Both in theory and in practice, the prior distribution can play many roles in a Bayesian analysis.
Perhaps most formally the prior serves to encode information germane to the problem being ana-
lyzed, but in practice it often becomes a means of stabilizing inferences in complex, high-dimensional
problems. In other settings it is treated as little more than a nuisance, serving simply as a catalyst
for the expression of uncertainty via Bayes’ theorem.
These different roles often motivate a distinction between “subjective” and “objective” choices
of priors, but we are unconvinced of the relevance of this distinction (Gelman and Hennig, 2017).
We prefer to characterize Bayesian priors, and statistical models more generally, based on the
information they include rather than the philosophical interpretation of that information.
The ultimate significance of this information, and hence the prior itself, depends on exactly how
that information manifests in the final analysis. Consequently the influence of the prior can only
be judged within the context of the likelihood.
In the present paper we address an apparent paradox: Logically, the prior distribution should
come before the data model, but in practice, priors are often chosen with reference to a likelihood
function.
We resolve this puzzle in two ways, first with a robustness argument, recognizing that our
models are only approximate, and in particular the relevance to any given data analysis of particular
assumptions in the prior distribution depends on the likelihood; and, second, by considering the
different roles that the prior plays in different Bayesian analyses.
1.1. The practical consequences of a prior can depend on the data
One might say that what makes a prior a prior, rather than simply a probability distribution, is
that it is destined to be paired with a likelihood. That is, the Bayesian formalism requires that a
prior distribution be updated into a posterior distribution based on new data.
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The practical utility of a prior distribution within a given analysis then depends critically on
both how it interacts with the assumed probability model for the data in the context of the actual
data that are observed. Consider, for example, a simple binomial likelihood with n = 75 trials
and some prior on the success probability, p. If you observe y = 40 then you can readily compute
the posterior and consider issues of prior sensitivity and predictive performance regardless of the
choice of prior. But what if you observe y = 75? Then suddenly you need to be very careful with
the choice of prior to ensure that your inferences don’t blow up. This doesn’t imply that the prior
should explicitly depend on the measured data, just that a prior that works well in one scenario
might be problematic in another.
Consequently, to ensure a robust analysis we have to go beyond the standard Bayesian workflow
where the prior distribution is meant to be chosen with no reference to the data and, ideally, the
data generating experiment itself.
1.2. Existing methods for setting priors already depend on the likelihood
This tension between the conceptual interpretation of the prior and more practical considerations
has largely split the long literature of prior choice into two sides: either you build a fully subjective
prior distribution with no knowledge of the likelihood, or you leverage at least some aspects of your
likelihood to build your prior. We refer to the first of these positions as maximalist in that the prior
distribution represents, at least ideally, all available information about the problem known before
the measurement is considered. The maximalist prior is implicitly backed up by the Bayesian’s
willingness to bet on it.
Any prior that isn’t fully informative but has any sort of theoretical or practical benefit leans
heavily on some aspect of the likelihood. The classic example of this is building priors from the
minimalist position which takes data and a model of the measurement process, and considers a
prior as little more than an annoying step required to perform a Bayesian analysis. From this
perspective, a natural starting point is a noninformative prior. Although it is impossible to define
“noninformative” with any rigor, the general idea is that such a prior affects the information in the
likelihood as weakly as possible. In practice the drive for noninformativity leads to the naive use
of uniform distributions as the limit of an infinitely diffuse probability distribution.
Related is the idea of the reference prior (Bernardo, 1979) which, again, serves as a placeholder
to allow Bayesian inference to go forward with minimal problem-specific assumptions. These as-
sumptions frequently require the statistician to replace knowledge of the likelihood with an asymp-
totic approximation, with the validity of this asymptotic regime ultimately affecting the practical
performance of the prior.
A structural prior encodes mathematical properties such as symmetry that represent underlying
features of a model. Examples of structural information include exchangeability in hierarchical
models and maximum entropy models in physics, which Jaynes (1982) and others have applied to
more general statistical settings. A structural prior is not minimalist as it includes information
about the underlying problem which is not driven by the measurement process, but neither is it
maximalist as it does not attempt to include all available information about the problem at hand. It
also makes the implicit the assumption that the structural information is consistent with reasonable
data generating processes.
A regularizing prior is designed to yield smoother, more stable inferences than would be ob-
tained from maximum likelihood estimation or Bayesian inference with a flat prior. Exactly how a
regularizing prior accomplishes this goal clearly depends on the exact nature of the likelihood itself.
Regularization, even if applied in a Bayesian context, is a frequentist goal (Rubin, 1984) in that
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its success is quantified in terms of the statistical properties of the inferences from an ensemble of
possible measurements.
The ground between structural and regularising priors is occupied by the more recent, and
considerably more hazy, idea of weakly informative priors that are explicitly designed to encode
information that applies to a general class of problems without taking full advantage of problem-
specific knowledge (Gelman et al., 2008, Simpson et al., 2017). We argue that these are, in a
pragmatic sense, hyper-Jaynesian in that they are designed to regularize inferences with structural
information.
1.3. The role of the prior in generative and predictive modeling
One aim of this paper is to critically examine the common misconception that prior modeling
doesn’t matter. We argue that for the sorts of complex data encountered in modern applications,
aspects of the prior distributions persist into the posterior and, as such, we have to think carefully
about how to specify the prior in the context of the likelihood.
In particular, understanding this context requires that we think generatively by considering the
potential measurements consistent with a given prior and predictively by validating those potential
measurements against data that we collect. The fundamental tool for understanding the effect of
the prior on inference before data has been collected is the prior predictive distribution, while the
fundamental tool for validating the model after data have been collected is the posterior predictive
distribution. The careful application of these tools leads us to some concrete recommendations of
how to choose a prior that ensures robust Bayesian analyses in practice.
2. A simple motivating example
To appreciate how impactful the prior can be in a real problem, consider the paper, “Beautiful
parents have more daughters,” by Kanazawa (2007), who analyzed data from a longitudinal survey
that included a measure of adolescent respondents’ attractiveness on a 1–5 scale, and followed
up over the several years and recorded the sex of these people’s children. The sample size was
approximately 3000. There was positive correlation between attractiveness and sex ratio in the
sample: a linear regression found that a 2-point difference in attractiveness corresponds to a 3.0
percentage point difference in the probability of a girl birth, with a standard deviation of 2.7
percentage points.
This estimate is not statistically significant at the conventional level and, as such, would not be
generally taken as useful evidence. The published paper, however, featured a comparison between
the sex ratio of children of the most attractive parents (category 5), compared to those of categories
1–4. For this particular comparison, the proportion of girl births was 8 percentage points higher
among most attractive parents, and this difference was reported as having a t-statistic of 2.44,
implying a standard error of 3.3 percentage points.
For simplicity, we shall proceed with the simple comparison—the estimate of 8±3.3 percentage
points—setting aside legitimate concerns of selection and multiple comparisons because they are
not relevant to our concerns in this paper. The resulting model has two parameters: the probability
of girl births for beautiful parents, p1, and for others, p2, which we shall parameterize as p2 and
δ = p1 − p2. The overall probability of girl births is very well estimated from aggregate data, with
approximately 4 million births per year in the United States, and so here we only concern ourselves
with the prior distribution and inference for δ.
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2.1. Bayesian analysis under different priors
With a uniform prior on δ, the posterior is proportional to the likelihood, approximately normal
with mean 0.08 and standard deviation 0.033, thus an implied 99.2% chance that beautiful parents
are more likely to have girls in the general population, and an implied 50% chance that the difference
in probabilities exceeds 8 percentage points.
While it is well known that the definition of a uniform prior depends on parameterization, in
this case the estimated probabilities are so far from 0 and 1 that there would be essentially no
change in posterior inferences if the scale of the uniform prior distribution were changed to logit or
probit or any other reasonable transformation.
The danger here is that any uniform prior distribution contradicts what is known about the
stability of the human sex ratio. Over time and across populations, the proportion of girl births
has been remarkably stable at about 48.5%. There is some variation but this variation is low,
except in cases of selective abortion, infanticide, and extreme poverty and famine. For example,
the proportion of girl births is about half a percentage point higher among whites than blacks in
the United States, and there are similar or smaller differences when comparing younger mothers
and older mothers, babies born in different seasons of the year, and other factors that have been
studied. It is hard to imagine sex ratio having a higher correlation with parental attractiveness
than with these other variables—especially given that attractiveness in this particular study was a
one-time assessment from a survey interviewer.
For a fully informative prior for δ, we might choose normal with mean 0 because we see no prior
reason to expect the population difference to be positive or negative (see Gelman and Weakliem,
2009, for further discussion of this point) and standard deviation 0.001 because we expect any
differences in the population to be small, given the general stability of sex ratios and the noisiness
of the measure of attractiveness. The resulting posterior distribution of δ is then approximately
normal with mean 0.00007 and standard deviation 0.001; that is, our best estimate of the difference
in sex ratio is 7/1000 of a percentage point, with uncertainty of one-tenth of a percentage point.
Somewhere in between these two extremes would be a weakly informative prior, such as normal
with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.005, which would allow for the population difference δ to be
as large as one-half to one percentage point. The resulting posterior distribution is approximately
normal with mean 0.002, that is, 0.2 percentage points, and standard deviation 0.005, or 0.5
percentage points). For either the fully informative or the weakly informative prior, or variants
such as obtained by substituting a t distribution for the normal, the data are so weak that the prior
dominates.
2.2. Understanding the problem
The point of this example is that for the particular problem of estimating the parameter δ—a
difference in sex ratios that is certainly less than 1 percentage point in the general population—the
available data from 3000 survey respondents is laughably weak. A uniform prior then represents a
strong statement that δ can be large, which has has malign consequences for the posterior distri-
bution (and for science more generally given that the resulting paper was published in a reputable
journal and received uncritical publicity in major media, as discussed by Gelman and Weakliem,
2009). In other settings, however, a uniform prior distribution for a parameter estimated in this
way would work just fine: 3000 is a large sample size for the purpose of estimating real underlying
differences of 5 percentage points or more.
Thus, the prior distribution here can only be interpreted in the context of the likelihood. This
point is in some sense mathematically obvious—after all, the product of any Bayesian inference
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is the posterior distribution which filters the prior through the likelihood—but it contradicts the
conceptual principle that the prior distribution should convey only information that is available
before the data have been collected. The resolution of this apparent contradiction is that priors
(and, for that matter, likelihoods) can only be approximate, and the sensitivity of conclusions to
certain aspects of the prior will depend on the model for the data.
3. When exactly is the prior irrelevant in practice?
The sex ratio example shows how uniform priors can lead to nonsensical inferences even with what
can seem like a large sample size. A skeptical reader, however, should question whether this example
is pathological or indicative of a general problem.
Our experience is that in contemporary statistical practice the problem is indeed general. The
dominance of the information encoded in the measurement depends not only on the size of the
data but also on the structure of the likelihood and the effect being studied. The more complex
the likelihood and the smaller the effect being considered, the more data are needed to render the
prior irrelevant. To put it another way, when sample sizes are large and data are rich, one can and
should be asking more fine-grained questions. Given the challenging problems being analyzed at
the frontiers of applied statistics, priors are unlikely to be irrelevant.
3.1. Uniform priors are not a panacea and can do unbounded damage
To see why uniform priors are inappropriate, we need to think about what went wrong for the sex
ratios. The core of the problem was that, because the true difference δ was small, the data did a
bad job of finding it. There is an easy frequentist argument for this: the randomness of the data
means that the maximum likelihood estimator will take n data points and produce an estimate of
δtrue that satisfies δˆ = δtrue + Op(n−1/2). Unfortunately the random fluctuation in the estimator
is additive, which means that when δtrue is small n needs to be very large to avoid the natural
variation in the data from overwhelming the signal. It’s not so much that the uniform prior is
inherently bad, but rather that its interaction with the likelihood and the data facilitates poor
performance. It does not help that uniform or extremely broad prior distributions are often viewed
as a safe default prior choice.
3.2. Asymptotics: so close, yet so far away
Asymptotic arguments have traditionally played two roles when constructing priors. The first role
is to dispel concern by appealing to the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, which suggests that priors
have a second-order effect, in the sense that they wash out from the inference faster than the
inherent variability of the measurement. The sex ratio example shows that even for quite simple
models, this reasoning often doesn’t apply in real applications.
The second role asymptotic reasoning has had is in the actual construction of priors. Arguments
for the validity of reference priors, maximum entropy priors, and matching priors all rely on some
sort of asymptotic justification, which may or may not hold in practice. Indeed, these asymptotic
assumptions themselves represent prior information that has been chosen, explicitly or implicitly,
to have been included into the model.
The foundational work for most of the priors listed in Section 1.2, the key exception being
weakly informative priors, was done in the mid-to-late 20th century. Critically, these priors were
conceived, constructed, and publicized long before the computational revolution of the 1990s which
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has driven the the analyses of ever larger and more intricately structured data. Ultimately, the
applications that these priors were built to solve are not necessarily the same as applications of
interest today.
Today, datasets are bigger, and the models needed to capture the structure of those data can
be considerably more complex than those that were practical in the pre-Markov chain Monte Carlo
days. One of the most significant consequences of this big data, small signal revolution is the
failure of reference priors, maximum entropy priors, and most priors that try to match frequentist
properties. The problem is that these priors are justified at least partly by asymptotic arguments,
which requires a strong signal for parameters of interest.
In hindsight it is not surprising that using certain priors in situations where their asymptotic
justification does not hold results in poor statistical analyses. Given these challenges, we argue
that asymptotic analyses are best limited to quantifying when priors may perform poorly rather
than motivating the design of default families of priors.
3.3. For complex models, certain aspects of the prior will always be relevant
There are important classes of models in which the number of parameters increases with sample
size so that inferences are not identified by data even asymptotically. In such cases, the posterior
eventually concentrates not on a point but rather around some extended submanifold of parameter
space—and the projection of the prior along this submanifold continues to impact the posterior even
as more and more data are collected. When confronted with such a poorly identified likelihood
we must be particularly careful to ensure that the prior is sensible along the poorly identified
submanifold.
This problem is best understood though another example. Once the statistical equivalent of
“the good china,” coming out only on special occasions, Gaussian processes are now ubiquitous
in applied statistics. They also provide a tractable case where the interaction between priors,
likelihood, and data can be laid out precisely. Consider, a mean zero GP x(t) defined on the
interval [0, 1] with covariance function
cov(x(t), x(s)) = σ2 exp (−κ|t− s|) , σ, κ ≥ 0,
where σ is the marginal standard deviation and κ controls the range of the correlation, with x(t)
and x(t± 2κ−1) being approximately independent.
The usual asymptotic regime for this sort of model, known as the infill regime, involves more
observations of the same realisation of the GP within the interval [0, 1]. Under such infill asymp-
totics it is well known that the product σ2
√
κ is consistently estimable from the data, while the
individual parameters κ and σ are not (Stein, 1999, Zhang, 2004). The interpretation of this non-
identifiability is that the data cannot differentiate between a process with a long range and a high
variance and data with a short range and a low variance.
While it may be tempting to resolve this non-identifiability by fixing κ, there is strong empirical
(Kaufman and Shaby, 2013) and theoretical (van der Vaart and van Zanten, 2009) evidence that the
models will fit the data better if the parameter is allowed to vary. This puts us in an uncomfortable
situation. If there is only a small signal, then the problems identified in the sex-ratio example will
occur. On the other hand, even if the signal is strong enough to avoid this trap, the prior will still
affect the shape of the posterior along the ridge defined by σ2
√
κ = const.
An immediate consequence of this non-identifiability is that a prior on κ affects the posterior
for σ. For example, if the prior on κ has a very light right tail, which penalizes short ranges, then
the resulting posterior for σ will have almost no support around small variances. Fuglstad et al.
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(2016) recommend specifying the prior on (κ, σ) using coordinates parameterizing motion parallel
and orthogonal to the the ridge. These more natural coordinates motivated by the structure of
the measurement allow us to specify a meaningful prior on the ridge and ensure the parameter
estimates are useful. For example, because we know that the observations are contained within
[0, 1] we can argue that we want to avoid the part of the ridge where the range is much longer than
the domain and the marginal variance is compensatingly large.
This Gaussian process example demonstrates that the non-identifiabilities, and near non-
identifiabilites, of complex models can lead to unexpected amounts of weight being given to certain
aspects of the prior. In the Gaussian process case this is fairly easy to resolve analytically, but in
more complex hierarchical models, we know of no general techniques to identify problem areas in
the parameter space. In these cases, common sense and even weak subject-matter understanding
can translate into useful information along the non-identified submanifold and thus become the
basis for effective weakly informative priors.
4. A prior is more than just a probability measure, so we need to start thinking
generatively
Acknowledging that complex models can be full of hidden pathologies that are difficult to explore
mathematically is an important first step toward motivating robust priors for modern statistical
models. In particular, this realization extinguishes the hope of something as mathematically clean
as reference or maximum entropy priors being useful in practice.
We have to go further, however, to provide a route toward useful priors and, specifically, an
understanding of why weakly informative priors work so well in practice. If we dig deeper into the
reasoning underlying successful weakly informative priors, like the half-t on the standard deviation
for logistic regression (Gelman et al., 2008), then we begin to see a unifying principle: those
neighborhoods of the parameter space disfavored by a weakly informative prior correspond to data
generating processes that would look strange.
4.1. When is a probability distribution a prior?
This leads to an important but under-appreciated aspect of Bayesian analysis. While every prior
distribution is a probability measure, not every probability measure is a prior. A probability
measure becomes a prior only in the context of a measurement, or, more mathematically, it becomes
a prior only in the context of a likelihood. Importantly, we can judge a prior by examining the
data generating processes it favors and disfavors.
A trivial example of this principle is that a probability measure with all of its mass on the
interval [−4,−1] could never be a prior for the standard deviation of a normal distribution as it
violates the fundamental non-negative nature of a standard deviation. There is no corresponding
data generating process. This is not to say that distributions that are not priors are only those that
are mathematically precluded. A probability measure assigning all of its mass to the single point
σ = 37, for example, is unlikely to represent any form of reasonable prior belief for this problem.
The idea that a probability measure can be precluded from being a prior distribution on the
grounds that it will not interact sensibly with the likelihood to generate a meaningful data gen-
erating mechanisms is also important in the context of hierarchical models. Consider a logistic
regression where the logit probability is distributed as logit(pi) ∼ N(0, σ2) and p(σ) is zero for
σ ≤ 3 and half-Cauchy for σ > 3. This distribution is not mathematically precluded and is not de-
generate, but when paired with the likelihood it yields inferences that concentrate at the extremes
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of pi = 0, 1. More formally, the prior ensures that the model is completely separated no matter the
data.
In this case, we argue that p(σ) is not really a prior as the induced data generating mechanisms
are inconsistent with the data typical of a logistic regression. What happens, however, if we actually
observe data that exhibit complete separation, or, more likely, complete separation in one of its
subgroups? In that case, we need to make sure that whatever prior we use induces data generating
processes consistent with this extreme case. This is a subtle point; a probability distribution that
serves as a prior for one problem may not serve as a prior for another problem.
4.2. Prior choice is especially important in high dimensions
A homunculus for the types of pathologies seen in complex models is a simple linear regression with
Gaussian observation errors with a known variance and a design matrix with p orthonormal columns
where we measure only a single datum (N = 1). A possible prior for the regression coefficients β
is independent Gaussians with mean zero and unit variance; for each βj this prior represents that
belief that the data are scaled in such a way that the underlying coefficients βj are mostly in the
range (−2, 2). The way these independent priors interact with the likelihood, however, can cause
problems when there are many coefficients.
With the above prior and likelihood, the posterior for β is a product of independent Gaussians
with unit variance and mean given by the least squares estimator of β. The problem is that standard
concentration of measure inequalities show that this posterior is not uniformly distributed in a unit
ball around the ordinary least squares estimator but rather is exponentially close in the number of
coefficients to a sphere of radius 1 centered at the estimate.
That the posterior is very certain that the truth lies somewhere near the unit sphere is entirely
due to the prior, which strongly informs that β lies somewhere near a unit sphere. If this is
consistent with your prior knowledge then an iid standard Gaussian prior on β is a genuine prior
distribution, but if it’s not then it’s just a probability measure in the wrong place at the wrong
time. This example demonstrates that it’s not enough to investigate your prior in a parameter-by-
parameter manner: it is the joint behavior that affects inferences and so it is the joint behavior
that must be considered.
As we move to more complex and high dimensional problems, subtle joint behaviors like con-
centration of measure become more ubiquitous and hence more critical to consider (Gelman, 1996).
Unfortunately, these behaviors can sneak by even seasoned modelers. You should never underesti-
mate your prior.
4.3. Sensitivity of the marginal likelihood to the prior
The guiding principle for prior specification we have emphasized here can be encapsulated in the
question, Could this prior generate the type of data we expect to see? This accords with the
Jaynesian idea that a prior should reflect the constraints on the system. Rather than looking
for hard constraints which are difficult to elicit for complex models, however, we instead focus
on ensuring that most of the prior mass is in parts of the parameter space that correspond to
reasonable data generating processes. At the very least we want to ensure that our priors don’t
lead to any unintended structure in the parameter space and hence in data generated using the full
probabilistic model, such as β’s fondness for spheres in the above example.
The idea of building priors that generate reasonable data may seem like an unusual idea, but
the concept in deeply baked into traditional Bayesian practice. In particular, if we are interested in
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model selection or model averaging, the traditional tool is the marginal likelihood or Bayes factors,
the ratio of marginal likelihoods when comparing two different models (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
If we denote our data as y and our parameter vector as θ, then the marginal likelihood is defined
as p(y) =
∫
Θ
p(y|θ)p(θ) dθ. More importantly for our considerations here, if we do not evaluate the
marginal likelihood at our data then it becomes a predictive distribution for the data supported by
the prior or the prior predictive distribution. as the predictive distribution.
From this perspective the marginal likelihood computes the probability of a given measurement
by first simulating some parameters θ ∼ p(θ) and then simulating a measurement from p(y | θ).
The use of Bayes factors to choose a model can be seen as an application of decision analysis based
on an implicit utility function of prior predictive performance, which by construction is optimal on
average if the model is true.
If your model is not generative, however, then it makes no sense to compute the marginal
likelihood as it no longer manifests this interpretation. If you’re not worried about building a
generative prior, for instance, then it would be easy to artificially deflate the marginal likelihood
by putting more mass on unrealistic parts of the parameter space. Viewed this way, the most
commonly stated problem with the Bayes factor, that it doesn’t make sense when using improper
prior, is perhaps the least concerning aspect of its application.
In many settings the inappropriateness of the marginal likelihood manifests as high sensitivity
to aspects of the prior distribution that do not affect posterior inferences and hence can be difficult
to identify. The problem is that the prior predictive utility function judges models by how well they
claim to do given their own assumptions and completely ignore the validity of those assumptions.
In particular, uniform prior distributions typically yield atrocious predictive performance. Given
the above considerations, however, this shouldn’t be surprising as the non-generative nature of the
uniform prior obstructs the predictive interpretation of the marginal likelihood. That the marginal
likelihood can at best be seen as some sort of set-wise limit of prior predictive distributions offers
little reassurance.
To some extent these problems disappear when models are assessed using posterior predictive
distributions rather than prior predictive distributions. Moving to posterior predictive utility func-
tions, which average over the data-informed posterior instead of the prior, is more robust from this
perspective. Not that it’s universally correct, just more robust if your goal is predictive perfor-
mance.
As with many things, the truth here is conditional. Applications of posterior predictive distri-
butions are robust to prior specification only when the details of the prior are washed out by the
likelihood. In the example of the previous section, as with many contemporary problems, this was
not true. In these cases we need to use more principled priors, such as weakly informative priors to
get a posterior distribution, and hence a marginal likelihood, that is sensible. In particular, model
selection through posterior predictive is relatively stable under weakly informative priors.
Posterior predictive selection is stable under weakly informative priors, but does this mean
that marginal likelihoods are stable? Unfortunately, the answer in general is no. The posterior
often does not well identify the prior: many priors will yield the same posterior given a common
likelihood. This means that recommendations for diffuse and even weakly informative priors are
not well suited to applications of marginal likelihoods. If you want to use marginal likelihoods then
you had better be willing to defend every detail of your prior, even those that might seem otherwise
irrelevant. For a parameter of unit scale with an informative likelihood and zero-mean prior, for
example, a change in the prior standard deviation from 100 to 1000 leads to an approximate drop
in a factor of 10 in the marginal likelihood, even while having no appreciable effect on the posterior
distribution and corresponding inferences.
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5. Generative priors need to be prediction focused
In the previous section, we argued that Bayesian model comparison is at least implicitly a state-
ment about how well a model predicts new measurements. These comparisons fall into two varieties:
prior predictive methods, i.e. marginal likelihoods, where you try to predict measurements using
the prior uninformed by any data, and posterior predictive methods where you try to predict new
measurements using a posterior informed from previous measurements. Of these options, poste-
rior predictive methods offer meaningful, robust model selection procedures, while prior predictive
methods can give meaningless results, especially for prior models that can’t be viewed generatively.
This suggests that as well as being generative, we should ensure our priors facilitate good pre-
dictions. These are not the same thing. A prior is generative if the prior predictive distribution
generates only data deemed consistent with our understanding of the problem. On the other hand,
a prior has good predictive performance if the posterior predictive distribution is consistent with
the true data generating process and can predict new data generated from similar experiments.
Importantly, a good predictive prior allows the corresponding model to generalize and avoid over-
fitting.
5.1. In the sea of complex models, the leviathan is overfitting
One of the common ways that complex models fail to produce good posterior predictive distributions
is when the model “overfits.” Although useful as a concept, the definition of overfitting is difficult
to pin down, in part because the concept is generally understood as a comparison between fits
to training and test data, but the bare-bones Bayesian formulation p(θ|y) ∝ p(θ)p(y|θ) makes no
mention of test data. So to even consider overfitting it is necessary to consider some partitionable
structure of data. Alternatively we can say that a complex model overfits when it contains a simpler
submodel that does a better job at predicting new measurements—but then this requires some idea
of workflow or network of models, as, again, there is no concept of “submodel” in the most basic
expression of Bayes’ theorem. To our knowledge, the penalized complexity prior framework of
Simpson et al. (2017) was the first place that the avoidance of overfitting was explicitly linked to
prior construction. Their big idea was that, for a complex model MΘ, the simpler model that
potentially generalizes better can be written as Mθ0 , where θ0 ∈ Θ0 ⊂ Θ is one of a finite set of
parameter vectors that describe simpler sub-models of MΘ.
With this structure in place, it’s possible to talk about the a priori probability thatMΘ overfits,
that is the prior probability that θ is not in some small neighborhood of Θ0. That is, you can talk
about overfitting before you make a measurement by talking about how often draws from the
prior distribution give values sufficiently far away from Θ0. This allows you to check for potential
overfitting before a data analysis and then check for actual overfitting, using posterior predictive
checks, after the model has been fit to the data.
5.2. Overfitting leads to poor posterior predictive performance
Another way of understanding why priors that put sufficient mass around the simpler sub-models
can give better performance is by reconsidering Stein’s shrinkage estimator for the mean of a normal
distribution. If you see one data point y ∼ N(µ, σ2IN ) where σ is known, µ is unknown, and N is
the dimension of the observation, then the best estimator of µ, in the sense that it’s equivariant and
minimax, is µˆ(y) = y. Stein’s example showed that this “best” estimator can always be improved in
the sense that we can find a new estimator µ˜(y) such that ‖µ− µ˜(y)‖ ≤ ‖µ− µˆ(y)‖ whenever N ≥ 3,
where the inequality is often strictly true. Stein’s trick was to notice that the point µ = 0 has the
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property that if y is sufficiently close to it, it’s better from an ℓ2 error point of view to estimate
|µ| ≪ y than to estimate µ = y. A now standard analysis shows that this is true if |y| ≤ √mσ and
Stein’s estimator corresponds to a prior that puts a lot of a priori probability mass on this ball.
A big barrier to extending this idea into more practical situations is finding the equivalent
concept of a “ball of radius
√
mσ”. A moment thinking about the structure of the problems
suggests that the Euclidian nature of the ball is mostly an artifact of the problem, rather than a
generalizable quantity. It is an open question as to what shape these balls should have in general,
i.e. what shape should a neighborhood around Θ0 have, related to the fact that all of the tools
that we use to analyze these types of properties eventually require us to marginalize out the sort of
parameters that can only do in very simple cases such as when the problem is estimating the mean
of a multivariate normal distribution.
Simpson et al. (2017) made a heuristic argument that if the model is parameterized so that each
parameter controls a different aspect of the complex model then it’s sufficient to consider just the
local shape of the parameter space. They did this using a localized version of the Kullback-Leibler
divergence, which seems to work reasonably well in the cases that have been examined (Klein and
Kneib, 2016). There is some immediate work, however, that needs to be done to extend this to
more general classes of models.
5.3. Don’t forget your roots: predictive priors aren’t always generative
While this section has focused on outlining methods that build priors that give good predictive
properties, this still doesn’t absolve us of our obligation to ensure that the resulting prior is gener-
ative. Importantly, these can be competing aims.
Consider, for instance, the model y|µ ∼ N(µ, 1), µ|σ ∼ N(0, σ2), σ ∼ p(σ). The arguments of
Simpson et al. (2017), which are inspired greatly by Gelman (2006) and Gelman et al. (2008), argue
that p(σ) should have finite, non-zero density at σ = 0. On the other end, Polson and Scott (2012)
argue persuasively that, from an admissibility point of view, the prior on σ should have very heavy
tails, eventually advocating the half-Cauchy prior on σ advocated originally by Gelman (2006).
We argue that this prior is usually not generative. Around 1.2% of the time a half-Cauchy
prior with unit scale parameter will propose a standard deviation of more than 50, which seems
unrealistic if the initial parameters of the model are reasonably scaled. This is also born out in
numerical pathologies described by Piironen and Vehtari (2015).
We currently do not have a good recommendation on how heavy the tails of this parameter
should be. Experimentally, however, we know that if you’re confident of your scaling then a half-
normal on the standard deviation works well. If you’re less confident then an exponential is effective,
and if you’re even less confident then a half-Student-t with more than 3 degrees of freedom is useful.
And if you’re really struggling then the half-Cauchy is always there for you.
The practical guidance is to remember that you cannot have too many parameters with a
heavy tail in the model, lest the joint prior put too much probability mass onto a bad part of the
parameter space. Our rule of thumb is that the heavier the tail on one component of the model,
the less “ambitious” you can be with the rest of the model.
6. Discussion
The literature on the choice of Bayesian priors is mixed when it comes to the likelihood function.
On one hand, the mathematics of Bayesian inference and the very term “prior” suggest that the
model p(θ) should depend only on the space of θ and its context within the application, not on
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any hypothetical data that might come later. On the other hand, Jeffreys’ prior (Jeffreys, 1961,
Kass and Wasserman, 1996), long a popular default, is explicitly defined in terms of the likelihood
function, and other suggestions such as fractional or intrinsic Bayes factors (O’Hagan, 1995, Berger
and Pericchi, 1996) additionally depend on the concept of individual data points. For problems
with unbounded parameters, the utility of extremely diffuse and even uniform prior distributions
require conditions on the likelihood such that the posterior will be proper. This can lead to awkward
compromises where the prior is augmented a posteriori to account for certain data patterns such
as separation in logistic regression.
Improper priors are inimical to coherent Bayesian inference, but for many problems the structure
of parameter space is such that any prior that respects certain natural symmetry principles will be
improper. For a serious Bayesian this implies that these symmetry properties can be insufficient
or even entirely inappropriate. For example, it would not make sense to model the prior for the
probability of a girl birth as being translation-invariant on the logit probability scale. In settings
with strongly informative data and sparse prior information, such concerns can be safely ignored.
We view much of the recent history of Bayesian inference as a set of converging messages from
many directions—theoretical, computational, and applied—all pointing toward the benefits of in-
cluding real, subject-matter-specific, prior information in order to get more stable and accurate
inferences. This puts new and significant burdens on the developers and users of Bayesian meth-
ods, and an obligation for statisticians to develop default priors, or more generally procedures for
researchers to build bespoke priors, going beyond the traditional recommendations. At the same
time, those researchers need to recognize the importance of the prior and spend the time encoding
their expertise in probabilistic form.
In this paper we have argued that a prior can in general only be interpreted in the context of
the likelihood with which it will be paired. This pairing is best understood through the context of
prediction and the properties of the posterior predictive distribution which quantify how appropriate
a prior might be for a particular problem. This observation is critical to methodologists and
practitioners in guiding their efforts toward default and subject-matter-specific prior distributions
(Stan Development Team, 2017).
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